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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: The impact of the Asian economic crisis on
the Regional Container Lines
Degree: MSc
This dissertation is a study of the lessons learnt from the Asian economic crisis that
impacted on the Regional Container Lines (RCL) on the Thailand and Singapore
trade routes.   It compares the repositioning solution that RCL used at that time with
other possible repositioning solutions.
A brief look is taken at the correlation between the Asian economic crisis and the
imports/exports in volume to/from East Asian countries, particularly in correction
with the financial crisis countries that caused the imbalance of trade and the empty
container movements.   The impact of the Asian economic crisis on RCL is examined
in terms of repositioning costs and how much this effected RCL.   Benefit cost
analysis and weight average analysis are used to analyse the possible repositioning
solution with significant criteria such as conflict of interest, cost benefit and service
specification in order to recommend to RCL how to prevent high costs by
repositioning cost in the future.   The Internet packages such as Interbox,
SynchroNet, and Greybox are used to compare with Associated Empty Container in
order to find the best repositioning solution for RCL.
The dissertation finds Interbox is the best repositioning solution for RCL in overall
significant criteria as it gets more average marks than other possible repositioning
solutions.    However, it has some weakness in the conflict of interest between the
owner and management of leased fleets and was less cost effective for the correction
of empty container movements in the short-term with empty move transaction.   So,
RCL staff should read the rules very well and understand the responsibility of the
two organisations to prevent these conflicts.   It is the author’s opinion that RCL
should still be a member of Associated Empty Container in order to save more
repositioning costs in the short term.
iv
KEYWORDS: Asian economic crisis, Trade imbalance, Empty container
movements, Impact on Regional Container Lines.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Topic description
This dissertation is based on the lessons learnt of the impact of the Asian economic
crisis in mid 1997 on the Regional Container Lines (RCL).   In Chapter 2 the
dissertation considers the extent of the impact of the Asian economic crisis on trade
in East Asian countries particular in financial economic crisis countries and the
relationship between the Asian economy and Trade development.   Chapter 3
considers the extent of the impact of the Asian economic crisis in container
movement and how much this effected RCL.   Chapter 4 analyses the possible
solution to the problem of empty container movements for RCL and Chapter 5 has
conclusion and recommendations.
1.2 Scope of Topic
The scope of the topic of this dissertation will focus on the impact of the Asian
economic crisis on RCL in the Singapore and Thailand feeder trade routes since 90%
of RCL container movement inward and outward to/from Thailand is involved in this
route.
1.3Dissertation objectives
This dissertation has 4 main objectives as follows:
1. To describe, estimate and analyse the impact of the Asian economy on RCL.
2. To generate the possible alternative solutions.
3. To estimate with benefit and cost analysis each possible alternative solution.
4. To recommend the best solution to solve the problem of empty container
movements for RCL in the future.
21.4 Difficulties encountered in the investigation.
The difficulties encountered in the investigation in this dissertation are as follows:
1. The difficulties to collect the latest data information for analysis to find the best
solution.   The latest available data of RCL empty container movements is based
on the latest Thailand shipping statistics from 1998.   For the data of RCL empty
container movements in 1999 it has to be assumed that the average growth rate
decreased by 5% per annum from 1998.
2. The difficulties to forecast the possible percentage share of interchange
equipment, leased container, or empty move transaction for each solution.
This dissertation has to set the possible range of percentage from 10% to 50%.
1.5 The approach or research method
The approach of this dissertation to solve problems is as follows:
1. Collecting secondary data and information from the relevant year book data and
various periodicals of journals and magazines.
2. Interviewing key persons related to the topic of this dissertation by email.
3. Conducting literature research in the WMU library, WMU computer room, and
ISL library.
4. Consulting with experts at WMU, including visiting professors, visiting lecturers
and presenters during field studies.
The research method is based on the regression and correlation analysis, benefit cost
analysis, and the weight average credit analysis on the significant criteria factor.
3Chapter 2
Asian economic crisis
Chapter two describes the post Asian economic crisis that has signs of recovery in
1999 and 2000, analyses the impact of the Asian economic crisis on trade in East
Asia countries particularly, in the financial crisis countries and analyses the
relationship between Asian economy and Trade development.
2.1  Asian economy- road to recovery
Asian economic crisis in Asia during 1997-98 has signs of recovery on the beginning
of 1999.   As Helmut (2000) reported, “The serious economic crisis, which began in
Thailand in July 1997, is now abating and there are definite signs of recovery, with
positive growth rates forecast in 2000 for all of the affected economies of East Asia”.
Because of Asian economic crisis countries have trade surplus of export more than
import after they decreased their currency that let them to get more rising in their
reserves.   Theirs currencies are stable and the loan is very low in interest rate, which
together with fiscal expansion, that let them to begin of recovery.   As Jemal-ud-din
Kassum, Vice President East Asia and Pacific Region, The World Bank, (2000)
reported, “Throughout the region, external balances remain favorable: exchange rates
have been stable, reserves are high, exports are growing, and portfolio and foreign
direct investment is picking up steam.   Nor have signs of possible internal
imbalances emerged: inflation is low and unthreatening, government revenues are
rising in most countries, and capacity utilization rates are creeping up in
manufacturing”.   Figure 1 shows that the reserves of the East Asian 5 countries
(EA5): Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand, which are the five
crisis-affected countries (Worldbank) are rising from 90 US$ Billions in Q4 of 1997
to 140 US$ Billions in Q4 of 1998.   Because of a huge trade surplus in 1998, export
4trades of 85 US$ Billions compared with import trades of 60 US$ Billions produced
higher reserves from 90 US$ Billion in Q4, 1997 to 140 US$ Billion in Q4, 1998.
Contributing to confidence in currencies in the region, low interest rate and fiscal
expansion have led to the beginning of recovery (The World Bank Annual Report
[WB], 1999).
source : The World Bank Annual Report 1999.
Figure 1 East Asia the road to recovery
5However, the recovery is also fragile with external risks such as Japanese economy,
US and European economies, oil price, and interest rate etc.   As Masahiro Kawai
and Richard Newfarmer, (2000) reported, “A Japanese recovery is crucial to the
stabilization and prosperity of Asian economies but the Japanese economy has yet to
emerge out of stagnation”.   European economies, and US if they enter recession,
Asian exports would suffer and likely cut short recovery (The World Bank Annual
Report [WB], 1999).   Some external risks that have quite differential consequences
for the diverse national economies such as oil price.   If the oil price increases it will
hurt Thailand, Korea, and Japan but benefit Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia.
According to the World Bank staff (1999), estimate that oil prices are likely to rise
from an average of US$ 18 per barrel to US$23 in 2000.   This would impose terms
of trade loss on Korea of US$5.9 billion, Thailand would loss US$1 billion.  On the
other hand, Indonesia and Malaysia would get benefits of US$1.6 billion and US$0.7
billion respectively.
Another external risk is interest rate.   If interest rate increases are linked to floating
rate foreign debt, these will have the largest gross effects on China, Korea, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Thailand.   However, earnings on now-substantial reserves cushion the
net impacts substantially.   The region’s recovery might continue, but on a lower
growth trajectory (Kassum, 2000).
Table 1 shows that after a year of sharp recession in the EA-5 countries (-7.5 percent
in 1998), these economies bounced back in classic “ V” fashion to 4.7 percent in
1999.   Korea is better in growth rate of GDP than other countries in EA-5, with GDP
of 10 percent in 1999.   While, Indonesia has growth rate of GDP only 0.5 percent in
1999.   World Bank and IMF have forecast on March 2000 that the GDP of EA-5
countries will be more than 5 percent in 2001.
6Table 1
East Asia’s performance…and prospects brighten…
Real GDP percent change
Actual Estimate Projection
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
East Asia 5
Indonesia 8.0 4.5 -13.7 0.5 3.0 5.0
Korea 6.8 5.0 -5.8 10.7 6.0 6.1
Malaysia 8.6 7.5 -7.5 5.4 6.0 6.1
Philippines 5.8 5.2 -0.5 3.2 4.0 4.8
Thailand 5.5 -1.3 -10 4.0 5.0 5.5
Transition Economies
China 9.6 8.8 7.8 7.1 7.0 7.2
Vietnam 9.3 8.2 5.8 4.7 4.6 4.5
East Asia NIEs
Hong Kong SAR(China) 4.5 5.3 -5.1 2.0 5.2 4.4
Singapore 7.6 8.4 0.4 5.4 5.7 5.8
Taiwan(China) 5.7 6.8 4.8 5.5 6.5 6.1
Japan 5.0 1.6 -2.5 0.3 0.9 1.6
U.S.A 3.7 4.5 4.3 4.1 4.3 3.1
Source: World Bank, IMF; Consensus Forecast March 2ooo for Hong Kong SAR (China), Singapore,
Taiwan (China), Japan and the USA.
72.2 The impact of the Asian economic crisis on Trade
The Asian economic crisis caused a huge imbalance of trade in East Asian countries
particular, financial crisis countries.     These countries export to the US and
European countries more than import.
2.2.1 Trade development in Asia
The Asian crisis resulted in stagnation in Asia’s economic output for the first time
since World War II.   Japan’s GDP and EA-5 countries decreased for the first time in
more than 25 years, and for some countries in the region the decline was similar to
that experienced by the industrial countries during the Great Depression in the 1930s.
Hongkong, China and Singapore also did not escape the Asian financial crisis.
Japan’s sluggish economy and the Asian financial crisis caused the percent of Asia’s
merchandise imports to decline in 1998 by 18 percent by value and 14 percent by
volume (see Table 2 Trade developments in Asia, 1996-98).  Imports from North
America and Western Europe declined by less than the average, while imports from
regions that export mainly primary products to Asia, such as Latin America, Africa,
and the Middle East, decreased by more than one quarter.      Asian merchandise
exports decreased by nearly 12 percent by value and 10 percent by volume in 1998
due to the sharp contraction of intra-Asian trade.
Japan declined in volume of merchandise imports by 7 percent and exports 14
percent.   EA-5 also sharply declined in volume of merchandise imports to nearly 25
percent and 10 percent in exports, which caused an imbalance of trade with Western
Europe and North America.
The impact of the Asian economic crisis affected commercial service trade in Asia as
much as the merchandise trade.   Commercial service exports and imports declined in
8value by 20 percent and 13 percent respectively (World Trade Organization Annual
Report [WTO], 1999).
Table 2
Trade developments in Asia, 1996-98
Asia Japan EA-5
1996 1997 1998 1996 1997 1998 1996 1997 1998
GDP 5.2 3.4 -0.9 2.9 1 -1.1 7.2 4.5 -8.7
Merchandise trade
Exports(value) 0.7 5.3 -6.2 -7.3 2.4 -7.8 4.9 5.1 -3.9
Imports(value) 4.7 0.4 -17.8 4 -3 -17.2 7.2 -3.1 -30.8
Exports(volume) 4.8 12.6 2.2 1.2 11.8 -1.3 10 19 10
Imports(volume) 5.8 5.9 -8 5.6 1.7 -5.3 7.5 3 -21.5
Commercial services
Exports(value) 9 5 -15 4 3 -9 16 7 -24
Imports(value) 7 2 -11 6 -5 -9 14 5 -26
Source: World Trade Organization Annual Report 1999.
2.2.2 Imbalance trade
Imbalance trade seems to impact with East Asian countries particular, EA-5
countries more than a global.
2.2.2.1 World merchandise trade by region
In 1998 Asia was the second largest exports merchandise trade region and the third
largest imports trade region.   Table 3 shows that the Asian economic crisis caused
the share of merchandise exports to decline from 26.3 in 1993 to 24.5 in 1998.   In
the same year Western Europe was the largest export merchandise trade region with
9a share of 43.8 in 1993 and 44.5.   North America exported with a share of 16.8 in
1993 and 17.   Latin America, Africa and the Middle East had export shares of less
than 5 in 1993 and 1998.
Table 3
World merchandise trade by region in 1993 and 1998
1993 1998 1993 1998
Exports Imports
value
World 3636 5270 3744 5465
share
World 100 100 100 100
North America 16.8 17 19.9 21.1
Latin America 4.4 5.2 5 6.2
Western Europe 43.8 44.5 42.9 43.3
Africa 2.5 2 2.6 2.4
Middle East 3.4 2.6 3.2 2.6
Asia 26.3 24.5 23.5 19.9
Source: World Trade Organization Annual Report 1999
The Asian economic crisis also caused the Asia Merchandise trade import share to
decline from 23.5 in 1993 to 20 in 1998.   Western Europe, also, was the largest
imports merchandise trade in the world with a share of 43 in 1993 and 1998.   North
America increased its import share from 19.9 in 1993 to 21.1 in 1998, and was the
second largest import region replacing Asia in 1998.   Latin America, Africa, and
Middle East had import shares of less than 5 in 1993 and 1998.
2.2.2.2 Asia imbalance trade
The Asian economic crisis caused a huge imbalance of trade between Asia and the
major importers and exporter regions, Western Europe and North America.   The
Asian import volume in Annual percentage change declined from 6% in 1996 and
1997 to –8 % in 1998.   On the other hand, the Asia export volume in Annual
10
percentage change increased from 5 % in 1996 to 12 % in 1997 and decreased to 2 %
in 1998 (see Figure 2 Asia imbalance trade in volume, 1996-98).
Source: World Trade Organization Annual Report 1999
Figure 2
2.2.2.3 Financial crisis countries Imbalance trade
The Asian economic crisis caused more imbalances in trade in EA-5 countries than
Asia.   Figure 3 shows that the Annual percentage change in volume imports of EA-5
countries declined from 7.4% in 1996 to 3.3% in 1997 and –21.5% in 1998.   On the
other hand, the Annual percentage change in volume export of EA-5 countries
increased from 9.9% in 1996 to 16.0 % in 1997 and 10.1% in 1998.
.
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   Source: World Trade Organization Annual Report 1999
Figure 3
2.3 Correlation between Asia economic and Trade development
The correlation values between the Asian economic and import/export trade
development in 1993- 98 almost go in the same direction of change.   When the
Asian economy went very sharply in recession in 1998, the GDP declined nearly 5%
and both imports/exports declined in the same way.   Import volume declined 14%
and export volume declined 10%, see Table 4 Asia’s GDP and import/export in
volume, 1993-98.   From Table 4, the Annual percentage change in import/export
volume shows that the imbalance in trade started to begin by 1% in 1996, 6% in
1997, and 10% in 1998
EA-5 countries imbalance trade in volume, 1996-98 
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Table 4
Asia’s GDP and Import/Export in volume, 1993-98
Annual
%change 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP 6.3 6.4 5.8 5.2 3.4 -0.9
Import 9.5 13.5 14 6 6 -8
Export 5 10 9.5 5 12 2
                 Source: World Trade Organization Annual Report 1999
The regression and correlation analysis method shows that the relationship values
between GDP and import volume in table 4 are very close and more confident
values.   When GDP go down, import volume will go down and GDP go up, the
import volume will go up in the same way.   Figure 4 shows that the correlation of
the two parameters is depend on each other by 95% or correlation Coefficient (r) =
0.95.   However, the relationship values between GDP and export volume in table 4
are less close and confident.   Figure 5 shows that the correlation of two parameters
is depend on each other by only 48% or correlation Coefficient (r) = 0.48.
   Source: compiled data based on World Trade Organization Annual Report 1999
Figure 4
 GDP and  Imports (volume) in Asia, 
1993-98
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      Source: compiled data based on World Trade Organization Annual Report 1999
Figure 5
The significant variable that makes the relationship between GDP and export volume
to less in their relationships is the exchange currency rate.   In mid year 1997, EA 5
countries devalued their currencies by nearly 40% except Indonesia in which
devalued its by more than 60% (J.P. Morgan).   The consequence of a devaluation of
money was a rise in net exports and producing a huge trade surplus.   Table 5 and
Figure 6 show the correlation values between the index of Thailand exchange
rate/US dollar and trade imbalance in US$ billions for the EA-5 countries.   The data
in Table 5 shows that in Q1 of 1998, Thailand devalued the Thai Baht by 42 % and
the trade imbalance in EA-5 countries increased to 25 US$ billion in which exports
was larger than imports.   The regression and correlation analysis method shows that
the correlation between the Thai exchange currency rate and trade imbalance in EA-
5 countries is very close and more confidence value with the Correlation Coefficient
(r) = 0.91 or the two parameters are depend on each other by 91%.
 GDP and Exports (volume) in Asia,1993-98 
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Table 5
Thai exchange currency rate and trade imbalance in EA-5 countries
1997 1998
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
Thai exchange
rate*
100 103 88 76 58 75 78
Trade imbalance
US$ Billion -7 0 9 19 25 24 24
January 1997 = 100, Source J.P. Morgan.
Source: World Trade Organization Annual Report 1999
January 1997 = 100, Source J.P. Morgan.
                Source: World Trade Organization Annual Report 1999
Figure 6
Thai Exchange Rate and Imbalance Trade in East 
Asia economic crisis countries
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Chapter 3
The impact on Regional Container Lines
Chapter 2 has already explained and analyzed the impact of the Asian economic
crisis which caused the rise in the imbalance in trade where exports from Asia were
greater than imports to Asia.   This chapter will identify the impact of the imbalance
in trade to the Regional Container Lines (RCL), the feeder operating the main route
between Thailand/Singapore.
3.1 Regional Container Lines (RCL) fleet and operation
Regional Container Lines (RCL) is one of the largest and best known of the
common-user feeder companies operating in Asia, particularly on the Thailand and
Singapore trade routes.   RCL operated the first feeder containership in 1979 between
Bangkok and Singapore and increased and expanded its feeder services and container
liner business in intra-Asia.   Currently the Bangkok-listed, but Singapore-operated,
carrier offers service to 17 countries (78 destinations) with a fleet of 35 ships,
including four time-chartered units, aggregating almost 30,000 TEU.   According to
Containerisation International’s Liner Shipping Network data, this makes it the 38th
largest container carrying line in the world.   Its Annual lifting amass is 1.4 millions
TEU.
RCL has set up regional operations centres in Singapore, Bangkok and Hong Kong
to manage its shipping activities and to oversee development of its expanding
regional network.   RCL has agents in 17 countries such as Australia, Cambodia,
China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
16
Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam (Regional Container Lines [RCL], 20th
Anniversary).
RCL fleet size ranges from 600 TEUs to 1500 TEUs with registries both in Thailand
and Singapore.   Since 1990, RCL’s policy has been to phase new ships into service
approximately every one/two years (RCL, 20th Anniversary).
RCL has deployed 9 vessels, with an aggregate of almost 8,000 TEUs or 30 % of the
RCL total fleet.   Its fleet size on this route ranges from 600 TEUs to 1100 TEUs and
the fleets average age is 10 years (see Table 6 RCL’s containership fleet in Thailand
and Singapore).
Table 6
RCL’ s containership fleet in Thailand and Singapore
Vessel name TEU Reefer slot Year of
build
Deployment
Anan Bhum 1018 100 1995 Singapore/Thailand
Lila Bhum 740 100 1997 Singapore/Thailand
Mathu Bhum 1080 100 1990 Singapore/Thailand
Nanta Bhum 1080 100 1990 Singapore/Thailand
Ratha Bhum 628 60 1998 Singapore/Cambodia/Thailand
Siri Bhum 540 60 1980 Singapore/Cambodia/Thailand/
Malaysia
Vira Bhum 504 30 1974 Singapore/Malaysia/Thailand
Xetha Bhum 1080 60 1993 Singapore/Thailand
Yantra Bhum 1080 60 1993 Singapore/Thailand
Source: RCL, 20th Anniversary.
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RCL operates 6 feeder routes from Singapore/Thailand/Singapore in different
frequencies such as one trip per week, two trips per week, three trips per week, or
four trips per week.   The total of carrying capacity is 16,000 TEUs per week (see
Table 7 RCL’ s Feeder service network in Thailand and Singapore).
Table 7
RCL’ s feeder service network in Thailand and Singapore
Route Frequency Capacity Ports of call
Singapore/Thailand/
Singapore
Four a week 4*1000 Singapore, Bangkok
(KlongToey), Singapore
Singapore/Thailand/
Singapore
Two a week 2*1080 Singapore, Bangkok(Thai
Prosperity Terminal),Singapore
Singapore/Thailand/
Singapore
Four a week/
Three a week
4*570/
1,000
Singapore, Laem Chabang,
Singapore
Singapore/Thailand/
Singapore
Weekly 1*1018 Singapore, Bangkok(Siam
Bangkok Port), Singapore
Singapore/Thailand/
Singapore
Weekly 1*1080 Singapore, Map Ta Phut,
Singapore
Singapore/Thailand Three a week 3*504/
540/628
Singapore, Songkhla, Singapore
Source: RCL, 20th Anniversary
3.2 The impact of the Asian economic crisis on container movements
The impact of the Asian economic crisis in container movements seems not to be
very serious on a global basis, 19 – 20 % of empty/total container movements from
1990 – 1998.   But for the Transpacific and Asia – Europe trade routes it seems to be
very serious in imbalance trade, 80% growth rate of the container imbalance
movement in Transpacific in both 1997 and 1998, and 40% growth rate in Asia –
18
Europe trade in 1998.   The imbalance trade of container movements between South
East Asia and US is also very high with a 135% growth rate in 1998 and 30% growth
rate in 1997.
3.2.1 Asian container movements
The Asian container movement seems to be very serious in imbalance trade as a
result of the impact of the Asian economic crisis, particularly on the transpacific
routes.   Cargo movements from Asia to the United States increased from 4,1 mil
TEUs in 1996 to 5,2 mil TEUs in 1998, but on the other hand trade, decreased from
3,5 mil TEUs to 3,3 mil TEUs.   This caused an imbalance in cargo movements
between the eastbound and the westbound trade routes from 584 thousand of TEUs in
1996 to 1,9 mil TEUs in 1998 or almost 80% of the growth rate in both 1997 and
1998; it is estimated to be 2,5 mil TEUs in 2000 (see Table 8 Asian container
movements).           The imbalance of container movements on Asia – Europe trade
routes, also increased from 558 thousand TEUs in 1996 to 777 thousand TEUs in
1998 or almost 40% of the growth rate in 1998 and an estimated 911,000 TEUs in
2000.
3.2.2 South East Asian container movements
The imbalance of trade of container movements in Intra – Asia between South East
Asia and Japan, NIC, China is not so bad.   Table 9 shows that the imbalance trade
was not so high compared with container movements between the Transpacific and
Asia – Europe.   The imbalance of container movements was only 185 thousand
TEUs in 1997, 67 thousand TEUs in 1998, and 106 thousand TEUs in 1999.
However, the imbalance of container movements between Southeast Asia and the
United States seems to be more serious than that of Intra Asia.
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Table 8
Asian container movements
(Thousands of TEUs)
Year Asia-
USA
Asia-
Europe
 Asia -
USA
USA -
Asia
Imbalance %
change
Asia-
Europe
Europe-
Asia
Imbalance %
change
1996 4104 3520 584 3142 2584 558
1997 4662 3615 1047 79.3 3290 2734 556 -0.4
1998 5221 3326 1895 81.0 3487 2710 777 39.7
1999 5466 3266 2200 16.1 3633 2713 920 18.4
2000 5838 3328 2510 14.1 3811 2900 911 -1.0
Sources: UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data supplied by the Japan Maritime Research Institute;
DRI/McGraw-Hill, World Sea Trade Service Review, various issues; Containerisation International,
various issues, and other specialized sources.         * Forecasts for 1999 and 2000.
Note: European trades do not include the Mediterranean.
Table 9
Intra-Asia containerised traffic moving to/from South East Asia*
(Thousands of TEUs)
1997 1998 1999
Imports
From Japan 565 454 435
From NIC 530 530 565
From China 325 310 336
Total 1420 1294 1336
Exports
To Japan 374 341 323
To NIC 630 649 667
to China 231 237 240
Total 1235 1227 1230
Imbalance Trade -185 -67 -106
Source: DRI World Sea Trade Service     *South East Asia = Brunei, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
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Table 10 shows that the imbalance of container movement was increased from 175
thousand TEUs in 1996 to 531 thousand TEUs in 1998 or 30% growth rate in 1997
and 135% growth rate in 1998.   Consequently, the Asian economic crisis caused an
imbalance trade in container movements between South East Asia and the United
States which was more than Intra Asia.
Table 10
South East Asia and US container movements, 1996-98
(Thousands TEUs)
1996 1997 1998
US - South East Asia 545 566 400
South East Asia - US 720 792 931
Imbalance 175 226 531
% change 29.1 135.0
Source: PIERS/Journal of Commerce (New York)
3.3 The impact of the Asian economic crisis on RCL
The Asian economic crisis caused a huge number of empty container movements on
RCL, particularly in major trade route between Singapore and Thailand.   In 1998,
RCL had to carry the empty container movements almost 20,000 empty container
boxes or 26% of the empty/total container movements.   This increased from 16,451
empty container boxes or 18% of the empty/total container movements in 1996,
before the Asian economic crisis.   Therefore, the empty container movements
caused a high repositioning cost for RCL in 1998, estimated to be 223 mil Baht or
almost 2.5% of the total expense.
According to Sumate Thantuwanit, group president of RCL of Bangkok, the
imbalance between imports and exports was huge in Thailand.   This is the main
trouble for lines coming to Thailand but on the positive side, the country has just had
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three consecutive months of trade surplus after 1997 of trade deficits (see ‘Leading
owners report major impact of economic troubles on ports and lines’, Lloyd’s list,
February 26, 1998, p.16).
Chan Tuck Hoi, executive vice-president of the RCL group, explains: ‘Inbound cargo
volumes into South East Asia declined significantly and container imbalance became
more acute with the result that over capacity plagued all operators during the year,’
he said. ‘This resulted in revenues being eroded and costs being increased’ (RCL,
20th Anniversary).
As Lloyd’s list reported, a company such as RCL, which is widely regarded as one of
the strongest Asean intra-Asian trade feeder operators, has seen import cargoes to
Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia shrink to levels not seen for years, but with
containerised export cargoes, the picture is somewhat different.   RCL, Samudra,
WanHai Lines and other intra-Asian containership operators, are all reporting
increased loading for cargoes out of ports such as Laem Chabang in Thailand, Port
Klang in Malaysia, and various container-handling facilities across Indonesia.   The
weakness of the local currencies has been a temporary boon to exporters who now
have a distinct advantage with cheaper goods bound for the major US and European
markets (see ‘Box trades recovery under way’, Lloyd’s List, December 1999, p.11).
3.3.1 RCL empty container movements
RCL’s empty containers move in only one direction from Singapore to Thailand
because Thailand exported to the US and Western Europe more than imported from
them, during the Asian economic crisis, as already discussed in chapter 2.   RCL is
the major feeder operator between Thailand and Singapore in which 91% of
container movements inward to Thailand come from Singapore and the other only
9% come from other countries such as Malaysia, Vietnam, Hong Kong, Japan, or
others in Asia.   The percentage of container movements from Singapore increased
from 90% in 1996 at the beginning of the Asian economic crisis, to 91% in 1998
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(See Figure 7 RCL container movement inward to Thailand).   This figure was
compiled from data in Thailand Shipping Statistics 1996 and 1998, Office of the
Maritime Promotion Commission, Ministry of Transport and Communications.
 Source: compiled with data from Thailand Shipping Statistics 1994 – 1998.
Figure 7 RCL container movements inward to Thailand
Since Singapore is the hub port in the SouthEast Asia region, RCL moves container
cargo from South East Asia countries to Singapore port in order to carry it via the
main liner operators in the Transpacific and Asia – Europe trade routes.
During the Asian economic crisis, containers loaded in Thailand increased from
1,041 thousand TEUs in 1996 to 1,300 thousand TEUs in 1998 but containers
discharged in Thailand decreased, in the opposite direction, from 963 thousand TEUs
in 1996 to 779 thousand TEUs in 1998.   Consequently, it caused a rise in imbalance
container movements from 78 thousand TEUs in 1996 to 521 thousand TEUs in 1998
(see Figure 8 containers loaded and discharged in Thailand).   This seems to result in
big trouble for container lines inward to Thailand with empty container movements.
RCL also had a bad situation just like the other container lines.
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 Source: compiled with data from ISL, Shipping Statistics Yearbook, 1999.
Figure 8
The empty container movements inward to Thailand was very high during the Asian
economic crisis.   It increased from 21,981 boxes (22% of empty/total) in 1996 to
25,003 boxes (30% of empty/total) in 1998 or increased by 14% from 1996 to 1998,
particularly on the Singapore - Thailand feeder trade route.   The empty container
movements on the Singapore – Thailand trade route increased from 16,451 boxes
(18% of empty/total) in 1996 to 19,954 boxes (26% of empty/total) in 1998 or
increase by 22% from 1996 to 1998.   Total container movements were reduced from
90,736 boxes in 1996 to 77,259 boxes in 1998, a reduction of 15%.   On the other
hand, there were almost no RCL empty container movements outward from Thailand
(see Figure 9 and Figure 10 the movements of containers carried by RCL inward and
outward to/from Thailand).
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       Source: compiled with data from Thailand Shipping Statistics 1994 – 1998.
Figure 9
                Source: compiled with data from Thailand Shipping Statistics 1994 – 1998.
Figure 10
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3.3.2 Repositioning cost
The empty container movement from Singapore to Thailand as already discussed
above, caused RCL to pay higher expenses for repositioning costs.   It is estimated
that the repositioning cost increased from 156.8 mil Baht in 1996 to 222.88 mil Baht
in 1998 an increase of 66.7 mil Baht or 43% (see Figure 11 Repositioning cost in
1996 and 1998).   The higher repositioning cost was almost 2.5% of RCL’s total
expense in 1998.
This figure was compiled by data from Thailand Shipping Statistics 1996 and 1998,
Office of the Maritime Promotion Commission, Ministry of Transport and
Communications, based on the freight rate Singapore/Thailand.   The basic freight
rate of a 20-ft container was 4,730 Baht in 1996 and 7,470 Baht in 1998, and for a
40-ft container it was 9,890 Baht in 1996 and 12,490 Baht in 1998.   The additional
charges which included Bunker Adjustment Factor (BAF), Currency Adjustment
Factor (CAF), Terminal Handling Charge (THC), Container Yard Charge or CY
charge and Container Freight Station Charge or CFS charge, was 53.04% of the basic
freight rate in 1996, and 10.59% of the basic freight rate in 1998.
Table 11 shows that the total expense of RCL was increased from 6,356 mil Baht in
1996 to 10,321 mil Baht in 1998 an increase of 60%.   The repositioning as discussed
above is one of the major factors which caused an increase in RCL’s total expenses.
However, if looking at the total loaded boxes movement to/from Thailand, it will be
seen that both directions decreased, loaded boxes to Thailand decreasing by 25% and
out of Thailand decreasing by 6%.   The total revenue increased from 7,066 mil Baht
in 1996 to 10,542 mil Baht, an increase of 50% because the basic freight rate was
very high.   According to Lloyd’s List, June 2, 1998, shippers exporting merchandise
to northern Europe through regional Asian ports will soon be paying a premium to
compensate for the extra cost of repositioning empty containers.   Because of the
high cost of moving empty containers to feeder ports, the carrier is now asking
shippers in those locations to contribute towards these repositioning expenses.
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Source: compiled data from Thailand Shipping Statistics 1996 and 1998, Office of the
Maritime Promotion Commission, Ministry of Transport and Communications.
Figure 11
Table 11
RCL year record (in millions of Baht)
1996 1997 1998
Total revenues 7,066 9,552 10,542
Total Expenses 6,356 10,321 10,251
Pre-tax profit/loss 710 -770 291
Net profit 706 -1,109 285
Earnings/loss per share 31.95 -31.16 4.51
Total shareholders
equity
4,982 4,923 5,012
Total assets 14,081 23,752 19,555
      Source: RCL Group
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However for the worst situation, RCL has been doing better than other lines because
it has emerged as a stronger and fitter company.   According to Chan Tuck Hoi,
executive vice-president of RCL, “RCL took immediate action to deal with the
harsher and new operating environment created by the Asian currency crisis and that
the company was now fitter and trimmer to take advantage of new opportunities and
expand the service network”.
According to Kua Phek Long, chairman of RCL, this action included hedging the
company’s foreign currency exposure, thereby avoiding the worst effects of the slide
in the value of the local Thai baht and Singapore dollar against the US dollar.   In
addition to the usual controls being placed on salaries, fleet operating costs and
administrative expenses, the chairman highlighted the company’s investments in
improving its telecommunications and data management systems and training
programs.   In particular, this consisted of improved data processing in the areas of
container booking, preparation of shipping documents, container control and terminal
operations, as well as integration of marketing information with clients’ databases for
enhanced service (RCL, 20th Anniversary).
Figure 12 shows the percentage of empty and total container movements to Thailand
by container lines which increased very sharply from 12% in 1996 to 27% in 1998.
The percentage of empty and total container movements carried by RCL inward to
Thailand also increased from 18% in 1996 to 23% in 1998.   Compared with the
percentage of world empty and total container movements, 19 - 20%, the Asian
economic crisis caused liner containers and RCL to carry empty containers
amounting to a higher percentage than the worldwide average.
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Source: complied with data from Containerisation International Yearbook data, and
Thailand Shipping Statistics 1994 – 1998.
Figure 12
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Chapter 4
Repositioning solution
Chapters 2 and 3 have already explained and analyzed the Asian economic crisis
which caused the huge imbalance on trade between Asia - North America, and Asia –
Europe.   Imbalance trade between these areas resulted in many container liners and
feeder operations getting in to trouble since they had to move empty containers to
where there was a shortage and had to pay extra expense for the repositioning cost.
RCL also has a problem with empty container movements as do other liner.
This chapter will generate a possible repositioning solution for RCL to solve the
problem of empty containers on the Singapore and Thailand feeder routes and use
cost/benefit analysis to find the best solution.
4.1 Associated Empty Containers.
RCL solved the empty container movement problem by joining the Associated
Empty Container which is the group of Main Line Operations (MLOs) and fellow
feeder carriers carried container on the South East Asia trade routes and faced with
the same problem of empty container movements after the Asian economic crisis.
The associated members include the Malaysian International Shipping Corp (MISC),
American President Lines (NOL/APL), Maersk, Orient Overseas Container Lines
(OOCL), Advance Container Lines, Pacific Eagle Lines and Gemartrans.
RCL had to pay for loading empty containers on the MLOs less than loaded boxes
(Chan Tuck Hoi, executive vice – president of the RCL group, 1999).
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As Chalermkiat T. Paiboon, Asst. Regional Marketing Manager of RCL, June 2000,
confirms empty positioning from Singapore is still going on today just like what was
happening 10 years ago.   Currently, the cost of empty positioning is around US
$.180-210 per 20ft container and US $330-370 per 40ft container.   However, many
shipping lines are now trying to solve this problem by offering very low rates.
Presently freight rates for laden containers is around US$.50 /teu plus THC in
Thailand.   Chalermkiat stresses that with the emergence of Port Klang, now many
lines start to move to Malaysia because of cheaper port operation costs compared
with Singapore.   In this way, many lines have their empty stock at Port Klang and
they sometimes move their empties by rail from Port Klang direct to Bangkok and
Lad Krabang (container depot ICD, 25 km east of Bangkok) with low cost
(approximate US$. 150/teu) but small volume.   Normally the maximum capacity of
a train is 30 teus per trip and no space guaranteed by the rail operator.   In case they
can solicit a laden box, they will remove empties due to better pay.
The associated empty equipment repositioning on behalf of the MLOs and fellow
feeder carriers seems to be a good solution at this time because RCL can save
repositioning costs of around US$.130-160 per 20ft container and US$280-320 per
40 ft container.   To move empty containers by rail from Port Klang directly to
Bangkok and Lad Krabang, RCL can save repositioning costs of only US$30-60 per
20ft container and US$180-220 per 40ft container excluding expense from Singapore
to Malaysia.   So, the benefit of saving empty container movement cost by rail is less
than the associated empty equipment repositioning on behalf of the MLOs and fellow
feeder carriers.
According to Thailand Shipping Statistics, 1998, RCL had to carry empty containers
from Singapore to Thailand amounting to almost 20,000 boxes (9,500 for 20ft
container and 10, 454 for 40ft container), with an estimated repositioning cost of
around 5 mil US$ in 1998.
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Assuming the empty container movement decreased from 1998 with an average
growth rate of 5% per annum because of increase in the Thai GDP as already
discussed in chapter 2 and 3.   RCL will save repositioning costs of around 376-439
thousand US$ in 2000, if their empty containers were carried by MLOs and fellow
feeder carriers only 10% of the total empty container movements.   If RCL can join
the Associated Empty Container to 50%, RCL will save repositioning costs of around
1.9-2.2 mil US$ (see Table 12 Associated empty container saving costs).
Table 12
Associated empty container saving costs in 2000
Possible joining 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Empty container 20ft
(Boxes)
857 1715 2572 3430 4287
Empty container 40ft
(Boxes)
943 1887 2830 3774 4717
Repositioning saving
costs
(thousand US$)
376-439 751-878 1127-1317 1503-1756 1878-2195
Source: compiled data from Thailand shipping statistics 1998 (office of The Maritime Promotion
Commission, Ministry of Transport and Communication) and RCL group.
During the Asian economic crisis, the empty container movements inward from
Singapore to Thailand was just only one direction because exports from Thailand
were more than imports caused by the devaluation of the currency, as already
discussed in Chapter 3.   The volume of imports and exports, also, decreased from
the beginning of the Asian economic crisis.   Many shipping lines had the same
problem with a very low load factor on this trade route.   According to Thailand
Shipping Statistics, 1998, the load factor of shipping lines inward from Singapore to
Thailand was very low, almost 20%.   RCL seems to be better in load factor than
many other shipping lines inward from Singapore to Thailand with 32%.   So, when
shipping lines came to a joint agreement to carry empty containers with a lower price
than loaded boxes, it will benefits both parties for these shipping lines that trade on
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this route.   The empty container lines will get a benefit from a lower repositioning
cost, as already discussed above, and the shipping lines that offer to carry empty
containers will get a benefit from better utilization in their load factor.
RCL do not have to pay a fee to a broker for finding other shipping lines to carry
empty containers from Singapore to Thailand in order to reduce repositioning costs.
In the case of Internet packages such as InterBox, SynchroNet or Greybox to provide
information for matching interchange equipment, RCL have to pay fee for each
matching equipment as will be discussed later.
However there is no guarantee that this solution will be good in the long term, since
shipping lines will not be happy to carry empty containers, with low revenue when
the market is good.   They want to carry loaded boxes with higher revenue.   As Chan
said, “Although the movement of empty containers on behalf of MLOs pays less than
loaded boxes, RCL’s lean cost base means that a marginal rate of return is still
manageable on this traffic”.   In the Longer – term though, the company has seen an
equalisation process taking place in the price paid by MLOs for the relay of empty
and loaded feeder boxes as making a further positive contribution to the company’s
fiscal performance.
4.2 InterBox solution
InterBox is an on-line marketplace, accessible via the Internet, where shipping lines,
leasing companies, and other container users can trade container availability to
reduce operating costs by increasing container logistics efficiency.   On the InterBox
exchange, members post or search for offers that meet their needs (deficit or surplus),
then create binding contracts to interchange equipment, leased container, or empty
moves transaction. (http://www.Interbox.com).
InterBox ®, The International Container ExchangeTM, is a secure, neutral, web-based
marketplace where members can cost effectively source and reposition marine cargo
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containers.   The secure system enables members to control with whom they do
business by setting their own priority status of fellow members and rigorous
contracting disciplines are a key to the Interbox regime.   Members provide details of
their surplus and demand locations, and, once logged on, other members registering a
reciprocal matching requirement can activate a contact within moments (Tim Power,
VP of marketing IAS, 1999).
The benefit of InterBox to RCL is as follows.   Firstly, RCL will get a benefit from
the open wide range of container owners and operators comprising deep-sea lines;
leasing companies; regional, short sea and cabotage operators; and domestic
Intermodal carriers.   InterBox covers both global and regional markets, including
positioning requirements within the US and intra Asian markets.   The major users
are CMA-CGM Group, HLX-Hub Group, Hapag-Lloyd, Hamburg Sud, Matson
Intermodal, Mitsui OSK Lines, Mark VII Transport, OT Africa Line, P&O Nedlloyd,
Riss Intermodal, Sea-Land (Domestic), Triton and Textainer (IAS, 1999).   So, it is a
good opportunity for RCL to find matching equipment with other variety members.
Secondly, RCL will get a benefit from the Internal Asset system (San-Francisco-
based International Asset Systems or IAS has a mission to develop Internet based
business-to-business solutions), as InterBox enables container owners, operators, and
transport service provides access to a dynamic, global business-to-business
exchange.   They can source and reposition containers, search and post surplus or
deficit containers, or search and post container vessel slots capacity (Blair W.
Peterson, Commercial V.P of IAS, June 2000).   Blair, also, stresses that InterBox
completes transactions directly through a real-time bid/ask offer/counteroffer process
in an on-line marketplace.   InterBox is directed towards the broad market of
container owners, operators, and transport providers.   Since the Asian economic
crisis caused a one way direction empty container movement from Singapore inward
to Thailand, to solve the problem of repositioning, resolution is very complicated.
So, the on-line marketplace with InterBox, accessible via the Internet, is very useful
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for RCL because it can use a wide open range market to respond to their need.
Therefore, RCL has already invested heavily in new equipment and IT system in the
beginning of 2000, so it can use InterBox to improve utilization in the IT system to
get opportunities and marketplace via the Web.   As Tanthuwanit Sumate, president
of the RCL Group, (1999) says “RCL has made investment in developing an e-
commerce customer service called ‘BHUM’ net”.   To use InterBox connect via the
Web is very simple.   As Blair, (2000) says all that is needed is a computer connected
to the internet and a password – no client server software is necessary to install as in
the case of some competitors.   InterBox also enables a user control order/bid
process, which ensures that the economics of any transaction are driven to the natural
market level, giving both the container supplier and receiver the best possible deal.
Thirdly, InterBox can save repositioning costs for RCL through IAS which generates
its revenue on the basis of successful transactions.   It charges around US$20 for
each particular deal.   A ‘nominal’ monthly access fee is also applicable for use of
the exchange database (Timothy J Power, vice president of IAS).   The pricing of
moving containers depends on an agreement between InterBox and its members.
The system allows for on-line offer/counter offer negotiation, so, it is purely
dependent on the market (Blair Peterson, Commercial vice president of IAS)
Since the Asian economic crisis resulted in caused one direction empty container
movements from Singapore to Thailand, it is difficult to interchange containers with
other lines.   RCL has to pay a fee of around US$20 for each particular deal and
negotiate with members for a leased container (currently, US$1.30/20ft, and
$2.30/40ft per day).   The average number of days for leasing containers on the
Thailand/Singapore trade route is 4 days.   Table 13 shows that RCL will save
repositioning costs for different program of InterBox such as leased container, empty
moves transaction, and execute interchange program.   Assuming the average growth
rate of the empty containers in 1999 and 2000 decreases from 1998 by 5% per
annum.   RCL will save repositioning costs of around 417-480 thousand US$ for
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leased containers 10% of the total empty container movement and 2.1-2.4 mil US$
for leased containers 50% (see table 13 A leased container).   In the case of RCL
using empty moves transaction, it has to pay a fee of US$ 20 for each box and
negotiate a price of empty moves with other lines, currently around US$50/box.
RCL will save repositioning costs of around 339-403 thousand US$ for 10% of the
total empty container movement and 1.7-2 mil US$ for 50% (see table 13 B Empty
moves transaction).   In the case of RCL using execute interchange program with
other lines.   RCL will save repositioning costs of around 429-493 thousand US$ for
10% of the total empty container movement and 2.2-2.5 mil US$ at 50%(see Table
13 C Execute interchange program).
Table 13
Repositioning saving costs with InterBox in 2000
A. Leased container
Possible Leasing 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Leased container 20ft/year
(Boxes)
857 1715 2572 3430 4287
Leased container 40ft/year
(Boxes)
943 1887 2830 3774 4717
Fee charge
20US$/container
(Thousand US$)
36 72 108 144 180
Leased container costs
(Thousand US$)
13 26 39 53 66
Repositioning saving costs
 (thousand US$)
417-480 833-960 1250-1440 1666-1920 2083-2400
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B   Empty moves transaction
Possible empty move
transaction
10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Empty container 20ft
(Boxes)
857 1715 2572 3430 4287
Empty container 40ft
(Boxes)
943 1887 2830 3774 4717
Fee charge 20US$/Boxes
(Thousand US$)
36 72 108 144 180
Empty moves transaction
(Thousand US$)
90 180 270 360 450
Repositioning saving costs
(thousand US$)
339-403 679-806 1019-1209 1359-1612 1698-2015
C. Execute Interchange program
Possible Interchange 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Empty container 20ft
(Boxes)
857 1715 2572 3430 4287
Empty container40ft
(Boxes)
943 1887 2830 3774 4717
Fee charge (20US$)/boxes
(Thousand US$)
36 72 108 144 180
Reposition saving costs
(thousand US$)
429-493 859-986 1289-1479 1719-1973 2148-2465
Source: compiled data from Thailand shipping statistics 1998 (office of The Maritime Promotion
Commission, Ministry of Transport and Communication), RCL and InterBox information.
4.3 SynchroNet solution
Founded in 1996, SynchroNet Marine, Inc. the premier business-to-business
container exchange, delivers solutions that use innovative and database technology to
help carriers reduce the costs of empty positioning and the need for box leases
(http://www.synchronetmarine.com).   SynchroNet’s secure and neutral on-line
container exchange offers operators a central market place enabling users to increase
utilisation and reduce costs.   Through the Internet-based Cooperative Access System
(CAS), SynchroNet offers a direct business-to-business container exchange platform
where domestic and international container operators can recognise, activate and
manage high volumes of controlled container exchange opportunities.   Currently, the
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SynchroNet offering comprises three distinct services, International Service,
AsiaMax and US overland, (see ‘The SynchroNet solution’, container Management
Supplement, March 2000, P.S6-S10).
The heart of the SynchroNet advantage is the Cooperative Access System TM (CAS),
a sophisticated, highly secure database engine developed by SynchroNet.   This
engine is used to regularly combine and analyze confidential container flow and
imbalance data from different international carriers to recognize every opportunity
for controlled cooperation that exists among potential partners.   SynchroNet’s CAS
software connects users to their own segments of a dynamic, real-time system to
review, select and manage high volumes of controlled container exchange among a
broad range of partners (http://www.synchronetmarine.com).
SynchroNet is acting as a facilitator, the ‘deal’ itself is actually between the two
carriers directly.   It has 35 international shipping lines involved, which together
represent 40% of the world’s fleet.   Mark Kadar, vice president of Mercer
Management Consulting feels that SynchroNet is offering a more distinctive system
than its competitors because it is not just posting bulletin-board information.   It is
receiving data, analysing it and reporting back to the carriers where their problems
actually are (see ‘Synchro-savings’, Containerisation International, August 1999,
P.65-67).
The benefit of SynchroNet solution to RCL is as follows.   Firstly, SynchroNet offers
the very lowest cost solution.   The cost is nominal, being only US$30 per transaction
and no other charge (Ron Fuentes, staff Vice President of Sales, SynchroNet Marine,
Inc, June 2000).   Table 14 shows that SynchroNet can save repositioning costs to
RCL in different possible percent of interchange equipment with the total empty
container movements.   Assuming the average growth rate of the empty container in
1999 and 2000 decreases from 1998 by 5% per annum.   In the case of RCL can
exchange container with its members only 10% of the total empty container
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movements, RCL will save repositioning costs of around 412-475 thousand US$.
In the case of RCL can exchange container with its members at 50%, they will save
repositioning costs of around 2.1-2.4 mil US$.
Secondly, RCL will gain from the interchange of equipment with other lines through
Internet with a simple connection.   It is easy to get started with BHUM net in which
RCL have already invested in the beginning of 2000, as already discussed above.
SynchroNet need only an Internet connection and email facility (Container
Management Supplement, March 2000, p. S6).   So, RCL can use SynchroNet for
added value with their IT network system.   With the data pooling technology of
SynchroNet, RCL can view all potential available interchange opportunities.
In 1999, SynchroNet through its client server database provided a relational database
(SQL) that matched over 85 thousand containers globally, giving an industry saving
of over US$ 25 mil (Ron, June 2000).
Table 14
Repositioning saving costs with SynchroNet in 2000
Possible Interchange 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Empty container 20ft
(Boxes)
857 1715 2572 3430 4287
Empty container 40ft
(Boxes)
943 1887 2830 3774 4717
Fee charge (US$30)/Boxes
(thousand US$)
54 108 162 216 270
Repositioning saving costs
(thousand US$)
412-475 823-950 1235-1425 1647-1900 2058-2376
Source: compiled data from Thailand Shipping Statistics 1998 (office of The Maritime Promotion
Commission, Ministry of Transport and Communication), RCL and SynchroNet information.
Thirdly, RCL will exchange equipment in a Real-time, communication tool to send
instant messages or e-mails to partners and branch offices.   The SynchroNet system
is the only client server application with a Real-time exchange of equipment and the
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best protocol with multiple partners and multiple opportunities visible at 100% of the
time (Ron, June 2000).   In the case of RCL having a surplus in Singapore, and a
deficit in Bangkok, at the same time, the CAS will recognise a surplus and deficit of
RCL and the system also recognises that Maersk has a need of equipment in
Singapore and their routes via Bangkok.   In this case, both companies would select
the deal because it would save RCL from having to empty position these units to
Bangkok, while Maersk could secure the necessary containers to move cargo to
Bangkok, thus avoiding the probability of positioning or leasing units in Singapore.
SynchroNet is also quick to respond.   In such a case where RCL wants to cancel the
agreed booking, RCL can cancel the selected deal and indicate the reason in the “If
Cancelled, please provide reason below”.   The CAS imbalance field for Singapore
would then change automatically.
Fourthly, RCL will gain by interchanging its equipment with other lines through
SynchroNet in which it has 35 international shipping lines involved, which together
represent 40% of the world’s fleet (Stig Sevaldsen, VP of SynchroNet Marine, 1999).
SynchroNet’ s aim is to develop the product as a trading system effectively operated
by the shipping lines themselves.   It should be noted that Interbox and Greybox
provide a great value service to a leasing company’s customer.
Nonetheless, SynchroNet seems to be useful for deep-sea operators more than short
sea.   The SynchroNet concept is to balance the correction of both the origin and
destination imbalance without empty position (http://www.synchronetmarine.com).
Since the Asian economy causes container lines carry its empty container only in one
direction from Singapore to Thailand, so, it is difficult to interchange equipment in
order to balance both Singapore and Thailand.   Anyway SynchroNet is one that
provides email to solve the complicated repositioning.
Chalermkiat says that SynchroNet is an excellent idea, but not realistic.   It seems
that SynchroNet does nothing than offer information technology.   In the case where
40
RCL gets a container from Maersk line from Singapore to Bangkok, Maersk line can
reduce its reposition cost, but RCL shall encounter a container deficit in Bangkok
immediately because there will be no RCL’s container flow into Thailand.   Ron
Fuentes says, however, that all units are tracked by SynchroNet, all units are 100%
contracted to be back to the customer in a fixed time period as well as cost and
penalties if lost or damaged.
4.4 Greybox solution
Greybox provides to all shipping lines a computerized trading environment via its
electronic Bulletin Board offering a secure and neutral brokerage service.   This
service proactively assists members in identifying interchange opportunities with its
unique matchmaking capability.   Greybox co-ordinates all terms and conditions of
Membership via an addendum to Transamerica Leasing ’s master lease contract
which regulates the terms and conditions for Members, as both suppliers and users of
Greybox interchanges.   The Greybox service also includes a comprehensive tracking
and billing administration (http://www.tradexonline.com).
The benefit of Greybox to RCL is as follows.   Firstly, Greybox Logistics Services
(GLS) Inc. hosts a variety of different flexible product offerings that both
individually and together can offer many cost and administrative savings to container
operators.   The services employed can be generalised as:* Greybox Interchange
Service (GLS)- to match and promote the use of container interchange between
operators.   * Greyslot (GS)- to match available vessel space (slots) with the need to
position empty containers.   * Greybox Fleet Management (FM)- to outsource partly
or wholly container logistics management to Greybox, providing people, systems and
vast industry know-how to provide a cost guarantee based upon budgeted container
flows and imbalances (Stephen Fletcher, Commercial Director-Gleybox Logistics
Services Inc., June 2000).   RCL can use Greybox Interchange Service (GIS) to
supply or use their equipment on the Singapore/Thailand route, or Greyslot (GS) to
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match available vessel space (slots) with the need to position empty containers with
members.
Secondly, RCL will gain from the fully managed administrative process of GLS’s
network.   As Paul Crinks, 1999, VP of GLS says the company’s ability to fully
manage the administrative process is extremely important.   “Once the match
between clients has been made it is seamless for them as we did the tracking,
invoicing, collection, etc, and delivery to the contributing line’s preferred drop-off
point.   GLS’s network of dedicated service centres has also been expanded, the
company functioning out of eight offices located in New York, Chicago, London,
Singapore, Hong kong, Auckland, Brisbane and Sydney.   Currently, a team of 20
persons is dedicated to the company’s activities worldwide” (see ‘Greybox refined’,
Containerisation International, September 1999, P.75-77).   Crinks says “The main
benefit of Greybox over Interbox or SynchroNet is that we as well as having systems
employed on-line and available to our customers.   We also have people in place to
deal directly with our customers if they prefer not to use the systems provided” (S.
Fletcher, June 2000).
Thirdly, RCL will gain from the support of Transamerica Leasing ’s worldwide
organization, committed to quality and value added.   Transamerica is the world’s
largest lessor of marine container and intermodal freight equipment, with
approximately 1.2 million Teu under its control.   Internet leasing opportunities
through Tradex 1 Value-added management products are offered through its
subsidiary company Greybox Logistics Service division (Containerisation
International, September 1999, P.75-77).   As a Greybox is the new Interchange
Service from Transamerica Leasing operating under the brand name Tradex.
Since there is only one direction empty container movement from Singapore to
Thailand, as already discussed in chapter 3, it is difficult to find matching
interchange equipment with other lines.   So, leasing containers is one of the best
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ways to use in order to reduce the repositioning cost and the cost benefit will be
compared later.
Fourthly, RCL will gain from saving repositioning costs when using programs such
as Interchange or Greyslot.   For the Interchange program to supply equipment from
Singapore to Bangkok, RCL has to pay US$25 when supplied and US$25 when
returned.   All the time the unit is being supplied RCL will receive US$1.00/20ft, and
US$2.00/40ft per day.   The average supply unit in Singapore/Thailand is normally 4
days.   So, RCL will save repositioning costs of around US$ 386-450 thousand in the
case of RCL supply empty container 10% of total empty container and around US$
2-2.3 mil for 50%, in 2000.   For the Interchange program to use equipment from
Bangkok to Singapore in order to reduce empty containers at Singapore, RCL will
pay US$25 when picking up the box and US$25 when returning it.   All the time
while using the unit RCL has to pay US$1.30/20ft and US$2.30/40ft.   RCL will save
repositioning costs of around US$ 362-426 thousand in the case of using equipment
10% of total empty container and around US$ 1.8-2.1 mil for 50%.   Using Greyslot
from Singapore to Thailand, Greyslot will charge a $10 per box transaction fee to
both the slot provider and slot user.   The freight rate agreed between the parties will
be settled directly.   The average freight rate for carrying empty containers between
Singapore/Thailand is around US$50 per box.   So, in 2000, RCL will save
repositioning costs of around US$ 357-421 thousand for 10% and US$ 1.8-2.1 mil
for 50% (see Table 15 Saving repositioning costs with Greybox).
43
Table 15
Repositioning saving costs with Greybox in 2000
A. Interchange program when supplying equipment
Possible Interchange 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Empty container 20ft 857 1715 2572 3430 4287
Empty container 40ft 943 1887 2830 3774 4717
Fee charge (US$50)/Boxes
(thousand of US$)
90 180 270 360 450
Receive US$1/20ft and
US$2/40ft per day
11 22 33 44 55
Repositioning saving costs
(thousand US$)
386-450 773-900 1160-1350 1547-1800 1933-2250
B. Interchange program when using equipment
Possible Interchange 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Empty container 20ft 857 1715 2572 3430 4287
Empty container 40ft 943 1887 2830 3774 4717
Fee charge (US$50)/Boxes
(thousand of US$)
90 180 270 360 450
Pay US$1.3/20ft and
US$2.3/40ft per day
13 26 39 53 66
Repositioning saving costs
(thousand US$)
362-426 725-852 1087-1278 1450-1704 1812-2130
C. Greyslot.
Possible Greyslot 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Empty container 20ft 857 1715 2572 3430 4287
Empty container 40ft 943 1887 2830 3774 4717
Fee charge (US$10)/Boxes
(thousand of US$)
18 36 54 72 90
Empty move(US$50)/boxes
(thousand of US$)
90 180 270 360 450
Repositioning saving costs
(thousand US$)
357-421 715-842 1073-1263 1431-1684 1788-2105
Source: compiled data from Thailand shipping statistics 1998 (office of The Maritime Promotion
Commission, Ministry of Transport and Communication), RCL and Greybox Logistics Services
information.
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4.5 Repositioning solution Analysis
Repositioning solution analysis will be discussed in terms of conflict of interest, cost
benefit and service specification as follows.
4.5.1 Conflict of Interest
Conflict of Interest for RCL as follows will be analysed in terms of the conflict
between ownership and management of a container lease fleet, data sharing
limitation, absolute neutrality and security, and control of equipment.
4.5.1.1 Ownership and Management of a container lease fleet
Greybox and InterBox are possible to come into conflict with the ownership and
management of a container lease fleet, since both products have provided leasing
service to a leasing company’s customer (Sevaldsen, VP of SynchroNet Marine,
1999).   InterBox has strict rules to control their members (Tim Power, VP marketing
of InterBox, 1999) and Greybox has their ability to fully manage the administrative
process (Crinks, VP of Greybox Logistics Services, 1999).   RCL does not like more
control of management in their equipment since more control by strict rules of
Interbox or more takes care of control by Greybox with the chance of conflict
occurring between RCL management and the management of a container lease fleet.
Associated Empty Container and SynchroNet do not provide leasing services.
4.5.1.2 Data Sharing Limitation
Associated Empty Container has to share data with only their members and has a
limited scope of sharing data in the Southeast Asian region.   InterBox and Greybox
focus on leasing customer, even though they provide open wide range and variety
services of container with deep-sea lines, regional operators, short sea and cabotage
operators, and domestic intermodal carriers.   However, if compared with
SynchroNet, they have their focus on only container liners and with 35 international
shipping lines involved, which together represent 40% of the world’s fleet
(Sevaldsen, VP of SynchroNet Marine, 1999).   SynchroNet uses the Cooperative
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Access System or CAS to provide data pooling that helps users to view all potential
available interchange opportunities.   RCL seems to gain from data sharing with
SynchroNet more than with Greybox, InterBox, and Associated Empty Container.
4.5.1.3 Absolute Neutrality and Security
Associated Empty Container with MLOs and fellow feeder carriers is only an
agreement among liners, who want to reduce their repositioning costs and improve
their load factor caused by the Asian economic crisis, to carry empty containers at a
lower price than loaded boxes.   Some liners compete on the same trade route but get
both benefits of a win-win situation.   When they join agreements in same
association.   Greybox was support by Transamerica world’s largest lessor of marine
containers and intermodal freight equipment.   So, their interest is in the leasing
business, while, InterBox was operated by International Asset System or IAS-based
in San Francisco and has a mission to develop an internet–based, business-to-
business solution.   SynchroNet is a San Francisco–based, wholly owned subsidiary
of SynchroNet Marine AS of Norway.   It is a private, venture-funded company that
has one simple aim–to use innovative Internet and database technologies to help
carriers reduce their empty repositioning costs.   SynchroNet and InterBox seem to
give more absolute neutrality and security than Greybox and Associated Empty
Container.
4.5.1.4 Control of equipment
Greybox needs to pool equipment, the sum of all equipment interchanged via
Greybox and still in use by its members.   RCL was unhappy with the lack of control
their equipment.   As Chalermkiat, Asst. Regional Marketing Manager, 2000 said
that in case where RCL gets a container from Maersk line from Singapore to
Bangkok, RCL will encounter container a deficit in Bangkok immediately because
there will be no RCL container flow into Thailand.   Furthermore, the service
concept of short sea as RCL offers is totally different from the deep-sea carrier of
Maersk line.   Interbox and SynchroNet need not pool equipment but have some
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strict rules to control their members to return equipment back to a customer in a fixed
time period, as well as cost and penalties to be paid if lost or damaged.   They have
full control and visual contact with the units in their system.   Compared with
Associated Empty Container, RCL can fully control its equipment by loading its
empty containers on behalf of MLOs.
4.5.2 Cost Benefit
Cost Benefit as follows analysed in terms of RCL can solve the problem of
repositioning cost for the short-term and long-term with cost-effective solutions.
4.5.2.1 Correction of repositioning solution in the short-term
Since the Asian economic crisis caused an imbalance of trade in which Thailand
exported more than it imported, empty container movement inward from Singapore
to Thailand was only a one way direction, as already discussed in chapter 3.
Containers loaded in Thailand increased from 1,041,000 TEU in 1996 to 1,300,000
TEU in 1998 but containers discharged in Thailand decreased, in the opposite
direction, from 963,000 TEU in 1996 to 779,000 TEU in 1998.   Consequently,
increase of loaded in Thailand but a decrease in discharged caused by the rise in
empty container movements from 78,000 TEU in 1996 to 521,000 TEU in 1998.
The empty container movement from Singapore inward to Thailand was very high,
increasing from 18% of empty/total in 1996 to 26% of empty/total in 1998.   The
total container movement was reduced from 90,736 boxes in 1996 to 77,259 boxes in
1998, or a reduction of 15%.   Many shipping lines have the same problem with a
very low load factor, almost 20%, but RCL has a better load factor than other
shipping lines inward from Singapore to Thailand with 32%.   On the other hand,
there was almost no RCL empty container movement outward from Thailand.
As discussed above for correction of reposition solution in the short-term, to match
available vessel space (slot) with the needs to position empty containers from the
liners inward from Singapore to Thailand.   It should be possible to solve the
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problem of empty container movement, since the liners will get more revenue from
loading empty containers inward from Singapore to Thailand and want to improve its
load factor that was very low during Asian economic crisis.   While leasing and
interchange equipment with other lines seems to be less possible to solve the problem
because almost every line has the same bad situation with empty containers on
similar trade route.
Associated Empty Container, Interbox with empty moves transaction, and Greyslot
seem to be better to correct the repositioning solution for RCL in the short-term
period.
4.5.2.2 Correction of repositioning solution in the long-term
Empty container movement has been the problem of RCL not only during the Asian
economic crisis but also before and after the Asian economic crisis.   As
Chalermkiat, Asst. Regional Marketing Manager of RCL, 2000 has confirmed that
empty position from Singapore is still going on today just like what was happening
10 years ago.   Imbalance trades cause empty container movements either to export
more than import or export less than import.   Therefore, chapter 2 has already
discussed that the correlation between GDP and import volume are very closely and
more confident values with Correlation Coefficients (r) = 0.95 but the correlation
between GDP and export volume are less closely and confident, with Correlation
Coefficients (r) = 0.48.   Because of the exchange currency rate that made the
relationship between GDP and export volume less confidence, with the Correlation
Coefficient being very high as (r) = 0.91.   The GDP of Thailand was consensus
forecast in March 2000 by the World Bank and IMF is estimated to be 4.0 in 1999
and forecast to be 5.0 and 5.5 in 2000 and 2001 respectively.   It increased from –10
in 1998 and at the same as level in 1996 which was before the Asian economic crisis.
Imports to Thailand will be more in volume in 2000 and 2001 making less imbalance
trade and it is possible for Thailand import in volume more than export after 2001.
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The empty container movements will change to the opposite direction, from Thailand
to Singapore trade route.
For correction of repositioning solution in the long-term, Interbox with a variety of
different flexible products such as leasing container, empty moves transaction, or
interchange program should be a better solution for RCL to solve the problem in the
long term period than other solutions, since Interbox offers more opportunities and a
flexible method for RCL to solve empty container movement problems.   Greybox is
also good at solving the problem in the long-term with leasing containers and empty
move transactions, while SynchroNet offers only an interchange program with liners,
and Associated Empty Container can solve only empty move transactions with its
members.
4.5.2.3 Cost effectiveness
The Cost effective analysis as follows compares saving repositioning costs for RCL
when using empty move transaction, leased container, and interchange equipment
with associated empty container, Interbox solution, SynchroNet solution, and
Greybox solution.
4.5.2.3.1 Empty move transaction
Associated Empty Container can save repositioning costs more than Greybox and
InterBox when RCL uses empty move transaction.   In the case of 10% of empty
move transaction, Associated Empty Container can save US$ 376,000, Greyslot
saves US$ 357,000, and Interbox saves US$ 339,000 (see 4.1 Associated Empty
Container with MLOs and fellow feeder carriers, 4.4 Greybox solution, and 4.2
InterBox solution).   In the case of 30% of empty move transaction, Associated
Empty Container can save US$ 1,127,000, Greyslot saves US$ 1,073,000, and
Interbox saves US$ 1,019,000.    In the case of 50% of empty move transaction,
Associated Empty Container can save US$ 1,878,000, Greyslot saves US$
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1,788,000, and Interbox saves US$ 1698,000 (see Figure 13 Repositioning saving
cost in empty move transaction in 2000).
Source: compiled data from Thailand Shipping Statistics 1998, RCL, GreyBox
Logistics Services information, and Interbox information.
Figure 13
4.5.2.3.2 Using leased containers
InterBox can save repositioning costs more than Greybox when RCL uses leased
containers in 2000.   In the case of using leased containers to 10%, InterBox will
save US$ 417,000, Greybox saves US$ 362,000 (see 4.2 InterBox solution and 4.4
Greybox solution).   In the case of using leased containers to 30%, InterBox will save
US$ 1,250,000, Greybox save US$ 1,087,000.   In the case of using leased containers
to 50%, InterBox will save US$ 2,083,000, Greybox saves US$ 1,812,000 (see
Figure 14 Repositioning saving costs for using leased containers in 2000).
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Source: compiled data from Thailand Shipping Statistics 1998, RCL, Greybox
Logistics Services information, and Interbox information
Figure 14
4.5.2.3.3 Interchange equipment
InterBox will save repositioning costs more than SynchroNet when RCL uses
Interchange equipment in 2000, but not too much.   In the case of using Interchange
equipment to 10%, InterBox can save US$ 429,000, SynchroNet saves US$ 412,000
(see 4.2 InterBox solution and 4.3 SynchroNet solution).   In the case of using
Interchange equipment to 30%, InterBox can save US$ 1,289,000, SynchroNet saves
US$ 1,235,000.   In the case of using Interchange equipment to 50%, InterBox can
save US$ 2,148,000, SynchroNet saves US$ 2,058,000 (see Figure 15 Repositioning
saving costs for interchange equipment in 2000).
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Source: compiled data from Thailand Shipping Statistics 1998, RCL, InterBox
information and SynchroNet information.
Figure 15
4.5.2.3.4 Cost effectiveness
To compare saving costs between different solution above, we can see that
Interchange equipment with InterBox can save more than other solutions.   While
InterBox (using leased containers), SynchroNet (Interchange equipment), empty
move transaction by Associated Empty Container with members, or using leased
container with Greybox and other solutions save RCL less than Interchange
equipment with InterBox.   Anyway, empty move transaction with Interbox can save
less than other solutions.   Figure 16 shows an example of RCL cost effectiveness
using various solutions where the percentage of interchange equipment, leased
containers, or empty move transaction is 30% of total RCL empty container
movements.
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Thousand 
US$
10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
possible Interchange equipment
Repositioning saving costs for interchange 
equipment in 2000
InterBox
SynchroNet
52
Source: compiled data from Thailand Shipping Statistics 1998, RCL, InterBox information,
SynchroNet information and Greybox information
Figure 16
4.5.3 Service specification
Service specification as follows analyses in terms of real-time information exchange
and transaction administration, pooling and analysis capabilities, and cargo-based
(start-to-finish) transaction recognition that will benefit RCL to solve repositioning
costs.
4.5.3.1 Real-time Information exchange and transaction administration
InterBox, Greybox, and SynchroNet have the same concept to use a real-time on line
communication to access a dynamic, global business-to-business exchange where
they can source and reposition containers, search and post surplus or deficit
containers, or search and post container vessel slot capacity.   They complete
transactions directly through a real-time bid/ask offer/counter offer process in an on-
line marketplace.   While associated empty container is less in real-time information
RCL Cost effectiveness in 2000
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exchange and transaction administration than other solutions, their transactions
depend on the IT system of individual members.
4.5.3.2 Pooling and Analysis Capabilities
SynchroNet seems to be better in data pooling and analysis capabilities than InterBox
and Greybox, since SynchroNet system is the only one to use client server
application with a real-time exchange of equipment.   SynchroNet has the best
protocol in the industry, with multiple partners and multiple opportunities visible
100% of the time.   They are the only one that identifies multiple opportunities for
equipment with multiple partners in a real-time system environment.   SynchroNet
marries up, through sophisticated algorithms, data from a multitude of carriers in 6
continents and filters the contents to provide them with a 100% solution to the
imbalance of the industry.   According to Ron Fuentes, 2000, “last year SynchroNet
through our client server data base provided a relational database (SQL) that matched
over 85 thousand containers global.   An industry saving of over US$ 25 million.”
Interbox and Greybox seem to be providing only electronic bulletin board
information.
4.5.3.3 Cargo-Based (start-to-finish) Transaction Recognition
The SynchroNet system with CAS seems to be better in the comprehensive tracking
system than InterBox and Greybox.   All units are tracked by CAS to monitor and
steer active opportunities towards completion by coordinating cargo flows with the
most extensive range of redelivery locations in the industry, while InterBox and
Greybox only concentrate on the Web-site Internet market as facilitators.
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4.6 The best repositioning solution
According to 4.5 repositioning solution analysis which has already been discussed
above in terms of conflict of interest analysis, cost benefit analysis, and service
specification analysis for RCL, we see that Associated Empty Container is very good
as there is no conflict of interest between the owner and management leased fleet,
and RCL can fully control of their equipment.   It is also a good solution for
correcting empty container movements in the short-term period and fair about the
cost effectively analysis.   However, associated empty container is very poor in
absolute neutrality and security in which some members are competitors on the
similar trade routes.   It is poor for correction of empty container movements in the
long-term period because some members do not want to carry empty containers
when the market is good.   It is also poor on data sharing exchange information and
service specification analysis.   InterBox is better than other solutions in cost benefit
analysis.   It is also very good in service specification analysis and absolute
neutrality.   InterBox is good in data sharing exchange information, but it is very
poor in conflict between the owner and management leased fleet.   SynchroNet is the
best in conflict of interest analysis and service specification analysis.   It is also good
in cost effective analysis but poor for correcting empty container movements in the
short-term and fair for correcting in the long-term.   Greybox is very good in service
specification analysis and correcting empty container movements in the short-terms
and long-terms.   It is also very good in data sharing exchange information.
However, Greybox is very poor in possible conflicts between the owner and
management leased fleet, and lacks control of equipment because RCL has to put its
equipment in a pool asset.   Greybox is poor in absolute neutrality and cost effective
analysis.
The weight average analysis of overall significant criteria factor of each solution, is
the tool to analyse these possible solutions in order to find the best repositioning
solution.   Since the main point of this topic is to solve the problem of empty
container movements for RCL where the Asian economic crisis had an impact, the
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weight credit of Cost Benefit analysis should be double conflict of interest analysis
and service specification analysis.   The average mark of each significant criteria
factor is from 5 (very good) to 1 (very poor).   Table 16 shows that Interbox gets the
highest mark from weight average analysis with 4.23 marks.   SynchroNet, Greybox
and Associated Empty Container get 3.88, 3.25 and 2.81 respectively.   Therefore,
Interbox should be the best repositioning solution for RCL to solve the problem of
the Asian economic crisis impact.
Table 16
Weight average analysis
marks Associated.
Empty
containers.
InterBox SynchroNet Greybox
Conflict of Interest(1) 3.25 3.25 4.50 2.00
Owner/management lease
Fleet
5 1 5 1
Data sharing limitation 2 4 5 4
Absolute Neutrality 1 5 5 2
Control of equipment 5 3 3 1
Cost Benefit(2) 3.00 4.67 3.00 3.33
Correction in short term 4 4 2 4
Correction in long term 2 5 3 4
Cost effectiveness 3 5 4 2
Service specification(1) 2.00 4.33 5.00 4.33
Real-time Information
Exchange
2 5 5 5
Pooling and Analysis
Capabilities
2 4 5 4
Cargo-Based Transaction 2 4 5 4
Total 2.81 4.23 3.88 3.25
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Conclusion
The Asian economic crisis in mid-1997 caused a huge imbalance of empty container
movements, in which East Asian countries particularly in financial crisis countries
loaded containers more than discharged containers.   As a consequence of the Asian
economic crisis, shipping container lines and feeder operators on Thailand and
Singapore trade routes had the same problem with empty container movements from
Singapore to Thailand.
Chapter 2 found that the Asian economic crisis had an impact on countries in East
Asia and a financial crisis with a huge imbalance of trade for Asia – North America
and Asia – Western Europe trade route, and the relationship of the Asian economy
and trade development was close.   The Regression and correlation analysis in
Chapter 2 has shown that the relationship of Asian GDP growth rate percentage and
import in volume is very close.   However, the relationship of Asian GDP growth
rate percentage and export in volume was not quite as close because of the
significant factor of the currency exchange rate.   Therefore, the relationship of
currency exchange rate and trade imbalance was very close.
Chapter 3 found that the Asian economic crisis seems not to be very serious on a
global basis but for the Transpacific and Asia – Western Europe trade route it seems
to be very serious in empty container movements.   RCL had the same problem with
empty container movements as other container lines.   It had to carry a lot of empty
containers from Singapore to Thailand and pay a lot of repositioning costs during the
Asian economic crisis.
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Chapter 4 analyzes the possible repositioning solutions in order to get the best
solution to solve the problem of empty container movements.   It found that
associated empty containers with MLOs and fellow feeder carriers, InterBox
solution, SynchroNet solution or Greybox solution could be a possible solution.
Weight average analysis in Chapter 4, with significant factors such as conflict of
interest analysis, cost benefit analysis and service specification analysis shows that
the InterBox solution is the best solution in solving the problem of empty container
movements.
5.2 Recommendations
This dissertation shows that the InterBox solution was the best solution for RCL to
solve the problem of empty container movements in over all significant criteria.
However, the analysis in Chapter 4 found that the Interbox solution had some
weakness in the conflict of interest between owner and management of leased fleets
and was less cost effective for the correction of empty container movements in the
short-term with empty move transactions.   Some strict rules to control their
members of Interbox will bring to get conflicts between owner and management of
leased fleets, since RCL’s owner and staff does not always like any body to control
them.   RCL staff who should read the rules very well and understand the
responsibility of the two organizations can prevent these conflicts.   For less cost
effective correction in the short-term, RCL should still be a member of Associated
Empty Container as it used to be in 1998 and 1999 in order to save more
repositioning costs.
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